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Hurricane Katrina, which made landfall on
September 8, 2005, is the most costly catastrophic
event in history, with projected insured losses
in the range of $40 to $60 billion. The most
costly prior natural catastrophe was Hurricane
Andrew in 1992, which cost insurers $22.3 bil-
lion. The most costly man-made disaster was
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the
World Trade Center (WTC) in New York, which
resulted in about $40 billion in insured losses.
The increasing costs of catastrophes have
significantly stressed insurance markets. Insur-
ance works best for high-frequency, low-severity
events, which are statistically independent and
have probability distributions that are reasonably
stationary over time. Catastrophic events, and
particularly mega-catastrophes such as Katrina
and the WTC terrorist attack, violate to some
degree nearly all of the standard conditions for
insurability. These are low-frequency, high-
T
he frequency and severity of natural
and man-made catastrophes have
increased significantly in recent years.
Natural catastrophes include events
such as hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and
tsunamis; and man-made disasters include oil
platform explosions, aviation disasters, and ter-
rorism. As shown in more detail below, prior to
1986, the number of catastrophes rarely reached
150 per year; but since 1993, there have been at
least 270 catastrophes per year.1 Of the 40 most
costly disasters since 1970, 34 have occurred
since 1990 and 15 have occurred since 2000.
This paper evaluates the need for a government role in insuring natural and man-made catastrophes
in the United States. Although insurance markets have been stressed by major natural catastrophes,
such as Hurricane Katrina, government involvement in the market for natural catastrophe insurance
should be minimized to avoid crowding-out more efficient private market solutions, such as
catastrophe bonds. Instead, government should facilitate the development of the private market
by reducing regulatory barriers. The National Flood Insurance Program has failed to cover most
property owners exposed to floods and is facing severe financial difficulties. The program needs
to be drastically revised or replaced by private market alternatives, such as federal “make available”
requirements with a federal reinsurance backstop. A federal role may be appropriate to insure
against mega-terrorist events. However, any program should be minimally intrusive and carry a
positive premium to avoid crowding-out private market alternatives.
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1 These figures are from Swiss Re (2006). Swiss Re defines a catas-
trophe as an event that causes a specified amount of monetary loss
or loss of life above a certain threshold: In 2005, the monetary
threshold for an event to be defined as a catastrophe is $77.5 million
and the fatality threshold is 20. The monetary threshold is adjusted
over time so that the catastrophe count is consistent across years.
Loss statistics are in terms of insured losses. Total losses, including
uninsured losses and infrastructure, would be much larger.
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           severity events that violate statistical independ-
ence by affecting many insured exposures at one
time. Although considerable progress has been
made in modeling natural catastrophes, conven-
tional methods are much less effective in evalu-
ating losses from terrorism, given that terrorists
are continually modifying their strategies and
tactics.
Insurance markets tend to respond adversely
to mega-catastrophes. They respond to large
events, particularly those that cause them to re-
evaluate their estimates of the probability and
severity of loss, by restricting the supply of insur-
ance and raising the price of the limited coverage
that is made available. This occurred, for example,
following Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the
Northridge earthquake in 1994 and occurred again
following the WTC terrorist attack. Because insur-
ance plays an important role in the economy,
instability in the availability and price of coverage
generally leads to pressure for government inter-
vention in insurance markets. State governments
intervened in Florida and California following
Andrew and Northridge, and the widespread
availability of windstorm coverage in Florida and
earthquake coverage in California seems to be
largely attributable to government intervention.
The federal government has provided subsidized
flood insurance since 1968 and entered the market
for terrorism insurance as reinsurer of last resort
through the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
(TRIA). Governments in several other industrial-
ized nations, including France, Germany, Spain,
and the United Kingdom, also have intervened
in catastrophe insurance markets.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the
appropriateness of government intervention in
catastrophe insurance markets with a particular
focus on mega-catastrophes, both natural and man-
made. The paper begins with a statistical overview
of the recent history of catastrophes and then turns
to a discussion of the insurability of such events
through the private sector, considering the theo-
retical criteria usually associated with insurable
events. The resources of the U.S. insurance indus-
try and the global reinsurance industry are then
evaluated to provide perspective on the insura-
bility of large catastrophes. The last major section
of the paper evaluates potential public and private
sector solutions to the catastrophe insurance
problem, considering alternative risk financing
mechanisms such as catastrophe (CAT) bonds as
well as the most promising models for govern-
ment involvement. The discussion includes an
evaluation of the effectiveness of TRIA and the




The number of natural and man-made catas-
trophes since 1970 are shown in Figure 1. The
figure indicates a clear upward trend in the num-
ber of catastrophes; and a linear trend line fitted
to the total number of catastrophes has an adjusted
R2 of 0.87. There seems to be a pronounced shift
in the data approximately in 1988 and another
shift in 1994. Although scientists have not reached
consensus on whether the frequency of natural
catastrophes such as hurricanes has been increas-
ing, the major reason for the increasing number
of catastrophes is the accumulation of property
values in disaster-prone areas such as California,
Florida, the Gulf Coast, and, increasingly, Asia.
The value of insured catastrophe losses from
natural and man-made events, adjusted to 2005
price levels, is shown in Figure 2. Because cata-
strophic events also cause significant losses to
uninsured property, such as highways, sewer sys-
tems, and other infrastructure components, the
total value of losses from such events is higher
than Figure 2 suggests. However, the insured
losses are relevant in evaluating the insurability
of such events. Figure 2 shows that, except for the
WTC event in 2001, natural disasters cause more
insured losses than man-made events. However,
the WTC event illustrates that terrorism has added
a significant source of volatility that was not pre-
viously present. The severity data also show a
shift in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Prior to 1987,
total insured catastrophe losses never exceeded
$10 billion per year; but beginning in 1987, losses
have exceeded $10 billion in every year and have
exceeded $20 billion in 11 of 19 years. Following
Cummins
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Worldwide Insured Catastrophe Losses, 1970-2005
SOURCE: Swiss Re (2006).Cummins
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Table 1
Top 40 Insured Catastrophe Losses: 1970-2005
Insured loss1
(2005 $ millions) Victims2 Date (start) Event Country/Area
45,000 1,326 8/24/2005 Hurricane Katrina U.S. Gulf of Mexico, Bahamas
22,274 43 8/23/1992 Hurricane Andrew U.S., Bahamas
20,716 2,982 9/11/2001 Terrorist attacks on WTC, Pentagon U.S.
18,450 61 1/17/1994 Northridge earthquake (M 6.6) U.S.
11,684 124 9/2/2004 Hurricane Ivan: damage to oil rigs U.S., Caribbean
10,000 34 9/20/2005 Hurricane Rita: floods, damage to oil rigs U.S.. Gulf of Mexico, Cuba
10,000 35 10/16/2005 Hurricane Wilma U.S., Caribbean
8,272 24 8/11/2004 Hurricane Charley U.S., Caribbean
8,097 51 9/27/1991 Typhoon Mireille/No 19 Japan
6,864 95 1/25/1990 Winterstorm Daria France, U.K. et al.
6,802 110 12/25/1999 Winterstorm Lothar France, Switzerland et al.
6,610 71 9/15/1989 Hurricane Hugo Puerto Rico, U.S.
5,170 38 8/26/2004 Hurricane Frances U.S., Bahamas
5,157 22 10/15/1987 Storm and floods France, U.K. et al.
4,770 64 2/25/1990 Winterstorm Vivian Europe
4,737 26 9/22/1999 Typhoon Bart/No 18 Japan
4,230 600 9/20/1998 Hurricane Georges U.S., Caribbean
4,136 3,034 9/13/2004 Hurricane Jeanne: floods, landslides U.S., Haiti
3,707 45 9/6/2004 Typhoon Songda/No 18 Japan, South Korea
3,475 41 6/5/2001 Tropical Storm Allison U.S.
3,403 45 5/2/2003 Thunderstorms, tornados, hail U.S.
3,304 167 7/6/1988 Explosion on platform Piper Alpha U.K.
3,169 6,425 1/17/1995 Great Hanshin earthquake (M 7.2), Kobe Japan
2,814 45 12/27/1999 Winterstorm Martin Spain, France, Switzerland
2,768 70 9/10/1999 Hurricane Floyd: floods U.S., Bahamas et al.
2,692 59 10/1/1995 Hurricane Opal U.S., Mexico
2,621 38 8/6/2002 Severe floods Europe
2,438 26 10/20/1991 Forest fires affecting urban areas, drought U.S.
2,427 0 4/6/2001 Hail, floods, and tornados U.S.
2,366 246 3/10/1993 Blizzard and tornados U.S., Mexico, Canada
2,233 20 12/3/1999 Winterstorm Anatol Denmark, Sweden, U.K.
2,227 4 9/11/1992 Hurricane Iniki U.S., N. Pacific Ocean
2,088 23 10/23/1989 Explosion in a petrochemical plant U.S.
2,068 220,000 12/26/2004 Seaquake (MW 9.0): tsunamis Indonesia, Thailand
2,024 0 8/29/1979 Hurricane Frederic U.S.
1,993 39 9/5/1996 Hurricane Fran U.S.
1,981 2,000 9/18/1974 Tropical Cyclone Fifi Honduras
1,947 100 7/4/1997 Floods after heavy rain Poland, Czech Republic et al.
1,923 116 9/3/1995 Hurricane Luis Caribbean
1,887 18 8/1/2005 Winterstorm Erwin Denmark, Sweden, U.K.
NOTE: 1 Property and business interruption, excluding liability and life insurance losses. 2 Dead and missing: Figures are approximate
and from various sources.
SOURCE: Swiss Re (2006).a record-year in 2004, when losses totaled $48
billion, losses nearly doubled to $80 billion in
2005 with the devastation of hurricanes Katrina,
Rita, and Wilma. Katrina in particular not only
was an unprecedented natural disaster from an
insurance perspective but also raised significant
questions about the U.S. system for assessing,
mitigating, and financing disasters and disaster
relief.2
The top 40 insured catastrophe losses since
1970 are shown in Table 1: 34 of the top 40 have
occurred since 1990 and 15 have occurred since
2000; 7 of the 10 most costly hurricanes in U.S.
history occurred during the 17-month period of
August 2004 through October 2005 (Hartwig, 2005).
All but 3 of the top 40 losses are from natural catas-
trophes, and the losses from the WTC terrorist
attack are roughly six times the previous largest
man-made catastrophe, which was the explosion
and fire on the Piper Alpha oil platform in 1988.
The table also shows that the United States is the
primary source of large catastrophe losses world-
wide. In 2004, for example, 67.7 percent of
worldwide insured catastrophe losses were
North American (primarily U.S.) events (Swiss
Re, 2005a); and in 2005, the North American
total reached 87.1 percent of worldwide losses
(Swiss Re, 2006).
Figure 3 places the catastrophe losses in a
broader perspective by showing total insured
catastrophe losses as percentages of world and
U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). In relation to
world GDP, catastrophe losses were less than 0.05
of 1 percent until the late 1980s and have fluctu-
ated around 0.10 of 1 percent in more recent years.
In relation to U.S. GDP, catastrophe losses were
less than 0.20 of 1 percent until the late 1980s
and have been above 0.30 of 1 percent in several
years since 1990. There is a significant upward
trend in both series, with adjusted R2 values of
around 0.35 in linear time trend regressions.
Figure 3 suggests that catastrophe losses are large
and volatile from the perspective of the insurance
Cummins

















Catastrophe Losses Relative to World and U.S. GDP
SOURCE: Catastrophe losses: Swiss Re (2005a); World GDP: The World Bank; U.S. GDP: U.S. Department of Commerce.
2 For an excellent analysis of the lessons to be learned from Katrina
in terms of disaster assessment, prevention, mitigation, and financ-
ing, see Daniels, Kettl, and Kunreuther (2006).industry but are more manageable from an
economywide or societal perspective.
THE INSURABILITY OF 
CATASTROPHE LOSSES
This section evaluates the insurability of
catastrophe losses. The section begins with a
discussion of the theoretical criteria for insura-
bility and an analysis of the differences between
natural and unintentional man-made catastrophes
on the one hand and intentional events such as
terrorism on the other. The section concludes with
an evaluation of the resources of the insurance and
global reinsurance industries and an economic
evaluation of the insurance crises and cycles.
Criteria for Insurability
Individuals are averse to pure risk and are
willing to pay amounts greater than the expected
value of losses in return for transferring risk to an
insurer.3 Most businesses also have a demand for
risk transfer and, like consumers, are willing to
pay more than the expected loss to transfer risk to
another party. The amounts greater than expected
losses that individuals and businesses are willing
to pay for risk transfer give rise to gains from trade
that have motivated the development of the insur-
ance and reinsurance industries.
The role of the insurer is to assume risk from
individuals and businesses and to diversify risk
by pooling the losses of many policyholders. The
statistical foundation of insurance is the law of
large numbers. The role of insurers can be eluci-
dated by specifying a simple statistical model of
a risk pool. Let X1,…,XN  be a random sample
from a probability distribution with finite means
µi and variances σi
2, where Xi represents the loss
suffered by the ith policyholder in a risk pool. It
is helpful to assume that the Xi are normally dis-
tributed, although they are not necessarily inde-
pendent.4 The law of large numbers then states
that
(1)                   
where 
is the sample mean based on a realization of
losses from the N policies, 
is the average mean loss, and ε is an arbitrarily
small number. Intuitively, the law of large numbers
says that the sample mean becomes arbitrarily
close to the population mean as the sample size
increases. Thus, the expected loss is highly pre-
dictable in a sufficiently large sample.
With the normality assumption, we can use
the central limit theorem to specify the amount
of equity capital needed by the insurer. We assume
that insurers hold equity capital to achieve a speci-
fied insolvency probability, ε. Insolvency proba-
bilities are not driven to zero because holding
capital in an insurance company is costly due to
corporate income taxation, agency costs, regula-
tory costs, accounting rules, and other factors
(Jaffee and Russell, 1997). The central limit 
theorem specifies that the following variable
approaches normality as the sample size increases:
(2)                         
The parameter σN
2, the insurer’s loss portfolio
variance, is defined as
(3)                   
where σij = Cov(Xi,Xj). The normal distribution
implies that
(4)               
where z is the standard normal variate and zε is
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3 This discussion is based in part on analysis in Cummins and Weiss
(2000).
4 The law of large numbers does not require normality. Normality
is assumed here because it provides a convenient explanation of
the role of equity capital in the insurance market.such that Pr[z < zε] = 1 – ε. The amount of equity
capital needed to achieve a target insolvency
probability of ε is zεσN, assuming that policyholder
premiums cover the expected loss, Nµ –.
The standard normal result for equity capital
can be used to illustrate the effects of pooling.
Assume that the N risks in the portfolio are statisti-
cally independent, so that all of the covariances
in equation (3) are zero. Then equity capital per
policy is
(5)                          
where 
is the average variance. Thus, equity capital per
policy goes to zero as N goes to infinity, implying
that large insurers insuring independent risks with
reasonably small variances can charge a premium
very close to the expected value of loss.5 I call
insurance markets with independent risks, mod-
erate standard deviations per risk, and large N
locally insurable. The U.S. market for personal
automobile insurance is an example of a locally
insurable market.
The motivation for reinsurance becomes
apparent when we relax the assumptions under
which risks are locally insurable. For example,
reinsurance markets are likely to be required for
risks with large variances and small N, even if we
maintain for the moment the assumption that risks
are statistically independent. Further motivation
for the development of reinsurance markets is pro-
vided by relaxing the assumption that risks are
independent. If risks are dependent, the amount
of equity capital needed per risk to achieve a given
insolvency target becomes





N ij εσ σσ
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ij is the the average covariance among
the N risks. It is easy to see that the amount of
equity capital needed per policy approaches
If the average covariance is small, the risks may
still be locally insurable, but the market outcome
is inefficient in that the risk charge per policy
has not been reduced to approximately zero.
However, risks that are locally dependent
may be globally independent, for example, the
risk of tornadoes in the American Midwest versus
Australia. This provides an economic motivation
for reinsurance markets because insurers can
reduce their prices relative to competitors by
ceding the covariance risk to a reinsurer who can
pool the risk with independent risks from other
regions of the world. We call risks that are glob-
ally diversifiable through reinsurance globally
insurable.
Implicit in this discussion are some additional
criteria for insurability. One important criterion
is that N be sufficiently large for the law of large
numbers to operate such that the insurer achieves
effective diversification either locally or globally.
Also important is that σ –2 and σ –
ij (if the latter is
non-zero) be sufficiently “small”—again to ensure
that effective diversification takes place. If N is
too small or σ –2 and σ –
ij too large, then the amount
of capital the insurer must hold to achieve a suffi-
ciently small insolvency probability may be too
large for insurance to be feasible. Essentially, the
cost of capital may push the price of insurance
above the level that buyers are willing to pay for
coverage, eliminating the gains from trade.
Another important implicit assumption is that
sufficient data are available to enable the insurer
to estimate the parameters of the loss distribution,
µi and σi
2, and the covariances among risks, σij, if
the risks are not independent. This is a non-trivial
requirement, given that real-world risks are not
identically distributed such that applicants for
insurance have heterogeneous parameters. It is
well-known that insurance markets can break
down as a result of adverse selection if the insurer
is not able to discriminate among risks (Rothschild
and Stiglitz, 1976). A final requirement is that the
zN ij ε σ ￿￿ . as →∞
Cummins
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5 Notice, however, that this does not imply that large insurers need
no equity capital. The equity capital needed to achieve a target
ruin probability of ε with independent risks is 
which approaches infinity as N goes to infinity.
zN ε σ2,loss distribution should be reasonably stationary
so that parameters estimated from past data are
reasonably good predictors of future loss distribu-
tions. If the loss distribution shifts significantly
during short periods of time, such as one or two
years, the insurer will be unable to estimate pre-
miums or the required amount of equity capital
and insurability will break down.
The violation of any of the principal insura-
bility conditions may create situations where risks
are neither locally nor globally insurable. However,
if other conditions are satisfied, such risks may
be globally diversifiable through capital markets.
Consider the example of events with low frequency
and very high severity, where the covariances
among the individual risks making up a portfolio
are also relatively high. Examples of such risks
are unusually severe hurricanes and earthquakes
striking geographical regions with high concen-
trations of property values. For example, modelers
have estimated that a $100 billion event in Florida
or California has a probability of occurrence in the
range of 1 in 100 (i.e., a “return period” of 100
years). The capacity of the insurance and reinsur-
ance industries may be inadequate to insure such
events.
However, events of this magnitude are small
relative to the market capitalization of securities
markets. Thus, by introducing securitized finan-
cial instruments representing insurance risk,
catastrophic events in the $100 billion range are
diversifiable across the financial markets, even
though they may not be diversifiable in global
insurance and reinsurance markets. Such events
also have relatively low correlations with securi-
ties returns, effectively providing an attractive
source of diversification for investors. Securitiza-
tion extends the scope of diversification from
insurance and reinsurance markets to the entire
securities market, thus breaking down the problem
of small N, large σ’s, and intra-insurance market
correlations, in much the same way as reinsur-
ance can reduce or eliminate the problem of
non-insurability on the local level. Diversifying
insurance-linked risk across the securities market
provides the motivation for CAT bonds, which are
discussed in more detail below.
The final category of risks consists of events
that are so severe that they may not be globally
diversifiable even through securities markets. It
has been estimated that a severe earthquake in
Tokyo could cause losses in the range of $2.1 to
$3.3 trillion, constituting from 44 to 70 percent
of the GDP of Japan (Risk Management Solutions,
1995). Although it is possible that global securi-
ties markets could absorb a significant fraction
of such a loss, the full loss is unlikely to be fully
diversifiable. I call such events cataclysmic, or
globally undiversifiable.
Losses from mega-terrorism events may also
fall into the globally undiversifiable category. Such
losses are similar in many ways to losses arising
from war, which are generally not amenable to
private market insurance or diversification solu-
tions. In addition to sharing the problems of small
N and large µ and σ with mega-losses from natural
hazards, terrorism losses also pose the problem
of being very difficult to estimate. Modelers have
made significant progress in estimating losses from
natural hazards. Modeling firms such as Applied
Insurance Research, Equicat, and Risk Manage-
ment Solutions have developed highly sophisti-
cated models of natural hazard losses based on
both statistical data and scientific models of hur-
ricanes and earthquakes. The models have been
parameterized using detailed mappings of expo-
sures across the United States and in other major
countries. The hurricane and earthquake perils
are sufficiently stable in a statistical sense to give
modelers confidence in their ability to predict
the frequency and severity of future events and
to enable insurers to use the models to manage
their exposure to catastrophe risk.
Terrorism events are inherently much more
difficult to estimate than natural catastrophes.
Few statistical data exist that can be used to
estimate the parameters of loss distributions. Data
on terrorism activities obtained by the government
are confidential for national security reasons and
hence not available to insurers to assist in estimat-
ing premiums and loss exposure. Moreover, ter-
rorists constantly change strategies and tactics,
making any predictions from past data inherently
unreliable. Terrorists are likely to engage in “target
substitution,” shifting their attention to targets that
Cummins
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some progress has been made in modeling the
severity of mega-terrorism events, based on scien-
tific knowledge about the effects of nuclear and
conventional explosions and biological and radi-
ation hazards, little information exists that can
assist insurers in estimating the probability of
terrorism losses. The possibility that terrorists
could use weapons of mass destruction raises
potential losses from mega-terrorism to levels far
exceeding the potential losses from even the
largest natural catastrophes.
Another major difference between terrorism
and other types of catastrophes is that the fre-
quency and severity of terrorist attacks are signifi-
cantly affected by U.S. governmental policy. U.S.
foreign policy directly impacts the motivation and
likelihood of terrorist attacks from different mili-
tant factions. U.S. domestic policy and the success
of government homeland security programs
also affect the mitigation of terrorist attacks—
both in preventing such attacks and mitigating
the magnitude of any attack that does occur. More-
over, much of the information required to predict
terrorist events is likely to remain highly classi-
fied and unavailable to those outside of agencies
such as the FBI and CIA. In fact, one of the argu-
ments proffered in support of a federal role in
the provision of terrorism insurance was that ter-
rorism events represent a negative externality of
the national security policies of the sovereign
government. Thus, there are significant reasons
to believe that government may have to be the
insurer of last resort, at least for mega-terrorism
events.
Insurance Industry Resources, Cycles,
and Crises
As mentioned, insurance works best for high-
frequency, low-severity, relatively stationary,
relatively independent events with good data and
moderate loss volatilities.6 For such events, insur-
ers can accurately estimate premiums and the
equity capital needed to reduce insolvency prob-
abilities to acceptable levels, and the amount of
required equity does not lead to excessive prices.
Even for larger, less-frequent, more-risky events
such as commercial liability lawsuits, insurance
can also be effective most of the time. However,
there are significant questions about the ability
of the insurance industry to deal with the largest
catastrophic events. For various reasons, it is
infeasible and inefficient for the industry to hold
sufficient capital to finance losses arising from
very-high-severity, low-frequency events (Jaffee
and Russell, 1997). This section provides an
overview of the resources of the U.S. property-
casualty insurance industry and the global reinsur-
ance industry to gauge the industry’s capability
to sustain losses from mega-catastrophes.
The total resources of the U.S. property-
casualty insurance industry are shown in Figure 4.
In 2004, the industry held about $400 billion in
equity capital and collected premiums of about
$440 billion. Although this might seem to be more
than enough to withstand a catastrophic loss of
$100 billion, in fact, most of the premiums repre-
sent expected loss payments for high-frequency
lines such as automobile insurance and workers
compensation insurance. The premiums for home-
owners insurance, the line most exposed to natural
disasters, are only about 12 percent of the total.
Moreover, the $400 billion in equity capital repre-
sents the total amount held by insurers writing
all lines of business in all states. Only a fraction
of the total would be available to pay catastrophe
losses in high-exposure states such as California
and Florida because insurers not writing policies
with catastrophe exposure in those states could
not be called upon to pay claims.
Cummins, Doherty, and Lo (2002) investigated
the capacity of the U.S. property-casualty insur-
ance industry to respond to large catastrophic
events during the late 1990s. They considered the
aggregate resources of the industry nationwide
and also the resources of insurers writing policies
in the catastrophe-prone state of Florida as well
as the correlation of losses among companies,
another factor in determining the capacity to
respond to catastrophic events. The results indi-
cated that the industry could pay more than 90
percent of the losses from a $100 billion–loss
event. However, a loss of this magnitude would
have caused the failure of approximate 140 insur-
Cummins
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6 Some additional criteria for insurability are discussed in Swiss Re
(2005b).ance companies. This would be by far the largest
failure rate in the post-1900 history of the U.S.
property-casualty industry and would significantly
destabilize insurance markets. 
The aggregate equity capital of the global
reinsurance industry is shown in Figure 5. The
figure indicates that equity capital increased
significantly from 1990 to 2003, from about $250
billion to about $340 billion, and increased more
modestly in 2004 to $377 billion.7 The premiums
of global reinsurers were about $167 billion in
2004 (Standard and Poor’s, 2005).8 However, most
of the premiums are for high-frequency lines of
business. To put the equity capital totals in per-
spective, Figure 5 also shows the worldwide
catastrophe losses from Swiss Re (2005a) as a
ratio to the equity capital of global reinsurers.
Catastrophe losses can amount to a significant
proportion of equity, exceeding 15 percent in
1999 and 2001 and reaching 13 percent in 2004.
Insurance markets are subject to cycles and
crises, which can be triggered by shifts in the fre-
quency and severity of losses as well as investment
losses. The underwriting cycle refers to the ten-
dency of property-casualty insurance markets to
go through alternating phases of “hard” and “soft”
markets. In a hard market, the supply of coverage
is restricted and prices rise; whereas, in a soft
market, coverage supply is plentiful and prices
decline. The consensus in the economics literature
is that hard and soft markets are driven by capital
market and insurance market imperfections such
that capital does not flow freely into and out of
Cummins
















U.S. Property-Casualty Insurance Industry: Total Resources
SOURCE: A.M. Best Company, Best’s Aggregate and Averages (various years). Resources expressed in real 2004 U.S. dollars using the
consumer price index.
7 The capital numbers somewhat overstate the capacity of global
reinsurers, however, because they represent the total equity capital
of companies writing reinsurance. There are several large companies
participating in this market, such as ING, AIG, and AXA, that also
write significant amounts of coverage in the primary insurance
market. Hence, their equity capital supports both their primary
insurance and reinsurance obligations. In addition, as in the U.S.
insurance market, most of the equity capital is committed to support
coverage in high-frequency lines of business. 
8 Unlike the equity capital figures, the premium numbers are indica-
tive of business written in the reinsurance market. the industry in response to unusual loss events
(Winter, 1994; Cummins and Danzon, 1997; and
Cummins and Doherty, 2002). Informational
asymmetries between capital providers and
insurer management about exposure levels and
reserve adequacy result in high costs of capital
during hard markets, such that capital shortages
can develop. Insurers are reluctant to pay out
retained earnings during soft markets because of
the difficulty of raising capital again when the
market enters the next hard-market phase, leading
to excess capacity and downward pressure on
prices.
Hard markets are usually triggered by capital
depletions that result from underwriting or invest-
ment losses. The three most prominent hard-
market periods since 1980 resulted from the
commercial liability insurance crisis of the 1980s,
catastrophe losses from Hurricane Andrew in 1992
and the Northridge earthquake in 1994, and the
WTC terrorist attack in 2001. The 1980s liability
crisis was triggered by an unexpected increase in
the frequency and severity of commercial liability
claims, accompanied by a sharp decline in interest
rates in the early 1980s, and the catastrophe and
terrorist crises were driven by catastrophe losses
of unexpected magnitude. Each crisis not only
depleted insurer capital but caused insurers to
re-evaluate probability of loss distributions and
reassess their exposure management and pricing
practices.
The U.S. property-casualty insurance under-
writing cycle is illustrated in Figure 6. The figure
plots two important operating ratios for the indus-
try—the underwriting profit ratio and the overall
profit ratio. The underwriting profit ratio is the
difference between 100 and the industry combined
ratio, which is the sum of the loss ratio (losses
incurred divided by premiums) and the expense
ratio (operating expenses divided by premiums),
expressed as percentages. If the underwriting
profit ratio is positive, the industry is collecting
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Figure 5
Global Reinsurers: Aggregate Equity Capital and Catastrophe Losses
NOTE: Equity is expressed in real 2004 U.S. dollars using the consumer price index.
SOURCE: Standard and Poor’s, Global Reinsurance Highlights (various years).more in premiums than it is paying out in losses
and expenses—it is incurring an underwriting
profit; and if the ratio is negative, the industry is
incurring an underwriting loss. The underwriting
profit ratio is a useful indicator of underwriting
performance, but it is not a very good indicator of
overall profitability because it does not consider
investment income. The overall profit ratio cor-
rects for investment income by adding the ratio
of investment income to premiums to the under-
writing profit ratio. If the overall profit ratio is
positive, the implication is that insurers are mak-
ing profits when both underwriting and invest-
ment results are considered; and if the overall
profit ratio is negative, insurers are realizing over-
all losses.
Figure 6 reveals the impact of the liability
crisis of the mid-1980s and the catastrophe crises
of 1992-94 and 2001. The underwriting loss in
1984 was about 18 percent of premiums, and the
overall profit ratio indicated a net loss of about 7
percent of premiums in that year after considering
investment income. In 1992, the underwriting
loss, mainly due to Andrew, was 15 percent and
the overall profit ratio showed a loss of about 4
percent of premiums. The underwriting loss due
to the WTC attack was also about 15 percent of
premiums, and the overall loss was about 6.5
percent. With losses of this magnitude and volatil-
ity, it is not surprising that insurers restricted
supply and raised prices following these events.9
Another indicator of recent underwriting cycle
activity in the United States is provided by survey
data collected by the Council of Insurance Agents
and Brokers. The Council conducts a quarterly
survey of its members to determine the changes
in commercial lines insurance prices, based on
policies renewing in each quarter. The average
rate changes from 1999 through 2005 are shown
in Figure 7. The figure shows that prices had been
increasing significantly even before September
Cummins




























































































































U.S. Property-Casualty Insurance Industry Underwriting Profit and Overall Profit Ratios
SOURCE: A.M. Best Company, Best’s Aggregates and Averages (various years).
9 It is also noteworthy that the underwriting profit ratio is negative
most of the time. This is an expected result in terms of insurance
financial pricing theory. Premiums reflect the expected discounted
value of claims and operating expenses, whereas losses and expense
are reported at undiscounted values. Hence, even under normal
circumstances, an underwriting loss is the expected outcome.of 2001, and the prices in umbrella liability and
commercial property insurance spiked after 9/11.
However, beginning in early 2002, commercial
insurance prices began to decline sharply, reflect-
ing a softening of the market caused by inflows
of new capital and improved underwriting
profitability.
The underwriting cycle interacts with the
level of capitalization in the industry. A relative
measure of capitalization is provided by the pre-
miums-to-surplus ratio, the most widely used
measure of leverage for this industry.10 The pre-
miums-to-surplus ratio since 1980 is graphed in
Figure 8. The ratio was about 1.5 in the early 1980s
and then declined steadily to less than 0.7 in 1999,
before increasing again as a result of the hard
market and 9/11 claims in the early 2000s. The
sharp decline during the 1990s has been attributed
to over-capitalization in the industry as well as
the need for additional capital brought about by
higher loss volatility, particularly in liability and
property catastrophe insurance (Cummins and
Nini, 2002). Deterioration in the premiums-to-
surplus ratio is often associated with the onset of
a hard-market phase of the cycle.
Because profitability in reinsurance markets
mirrors the results in primary insurance markets
and because underwriting cycles also exist in
most other industrialized countries, the global
reinsurance market is also subject to underwriting
cycles.11 The cycle in the worldwide catastrophe
reinsurance market is shown in Figure 9, which
plots the rate-on-line index in this market. The
rate-on-line is a price measure defined as the
premium for a reinsurance policy divided by the
maximum possible payout under the policy.
The index increased from 100 in 1990 to approxi-
mately 375 in 1993, primarily due to Hurricane
Andrew. The index then declined steadily until
1999 and increased sharply following the WTC
attack and a general hardening of insurance
markets into the early 2000s. The decline after
Cummins









































Commercial Property-Casualty Premium Rate Changes by Line
SOURCE: Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers.
10 Surplus or policyholders’ surplus is the industry’s terminology
for equity capital.
11 For further discussion of the role of reinsurance in cycles and
crises, see Berger, Cummins, and Tennyson (1992).Cummins
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Figure 9
World Rate-On-Line Index: Catastrophe Reinsurance
SOURCE: Guy Carpenter (2005).Andrew reflected improvements in catastrophe
modeling and exposure management in the
industry as well as significant inflows of new
equity capital, particularly into new and pre-
existing insurers located in Bermuda.
Further evidence of the reinsurance under-
writing cycle is shown in Figure 10, which plots
the combined ratio and return-on-revenue ratio
for the global non-life reinsurance industry.12 The
combined ratio spiked at about 115 in 1992 and
again at nearly 130 in 2001; and the return on
revenue, which also reflects investment earnings,
tends to be the reverse mirror image of the com-
bined ratio. The losses incurred during crisis
periods lead reinsurers to raise prices and restrict
supply while they recapitalize and reevaluate
pricing and exposure management strategies.
The existence of cycles and crises implies
that the insurance industry goes through periods
when risk-bearing capacity is limited. Although
usually triggered by high-volatility lines of busi-
ness, the effects of a hard market extend to all lines
of business including generally predictable lines
such as automobile insurance and workers com-
pensation. Thus, capacity shortages can occur
even in high-frequency, low-severity lines of
insurance, emphasizing the difficulty faced by
the industry in consistently providing capacity
for low-frequency, high-severity losses.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR
SOLUTIONS TO FINANCING
CATASTROPHIC RISK
This section discusses public and private
sector solutions to financing the risks of natural
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12 The combined ratio is the sum of the loss ratio (losses and loss-
adjustment expenses incurred/premiums earned) and the expense
ratio (underwriting expenses incurred/premiums written). The
ratio is a commonly used measure of underwriting profitability.
Return on revenue is analogous but not identical to the overall
profit ratio. Return on revenue is defined as pretax operating
income/total revenue. Pretax operating income is underwriting
profit (or loss) + net investment income + other income. Net realized
gains or losses are excluded from pretax income. Total revenue is
equal to net premiums earned + net investment income + other
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Figure 10
Global Non-Life Reinsurance Industry: Financial Performance
SOURCE: Standard and Poor’s, Global Reinsurance Highlights (2005).catastrophes and terrorism, beginning with the
securitization of catastrophic risk. Public sector
solutions to the catastrophic-risk problem are then
discussed, including a review of public sector
mechanisms currently in place in the United
States and other industrialized nations. The sec-
tion concludes with an evaluation of TRIA and
recommendations regarding the need for govern-
mental involvement in the future.
CAT Bonds
Following Hurricane Andrew in 1992, efforts
began to access securities markets directly as a
mechanism for financing future catastrophic
events. The first contracts were launched by the
Chicago Board of Trade, which introduced catas-
trophe futures in 1992 and later introduced catas-
trophe put and call options. The options were
based on aggregate catastrophe-loss indices com-
piled by Property Claims Services, an insurance
industry statistical agent.13 The contracts were
later withdrawn because of lack of trading volume.
Insurers had little interest in the contracts for var-
ious reasons, including the thinness of the market,
possible counterparty risk on the occurrence of a
major catastrophe, and the potential for disrupting
long-term relationships with reinsurers. Another
concern was that the contracts were subject to
excessive basis risk; that is, the risk that payoffs
under the contracts would be insufficiently cor-
related with insurer losses. A study by Cummins,
Lalonde, and Phillips (2004) confirms that basis
risk was a legitimate concern. They found that
most insurers could not hedge their exposure to
Florida hurricane risk very effectively using a
statewide index but that all but the smallest
insurers could hedge effectively using four intra-
Florida regional indices.
Another early attempt at securitization
involved contingent notes known as “Act of God”
bonds. In 1995, Nationwide issued $400 million
in contingent notes through a special trust,
Nationwide Contingent Surplus Note Trust.
Proceeds from the sale of the bonds were invested
in 10-year Treasury securities, and investors were
provided with a coupon payment equal to 220
basis points over that of Treasuries. Embedded in
these contingent capital notes was a “substitutabil-
ity” option for Nationwide. Given a prespecified
event that depleted Nationwide’s equity capital,
Nationwide could substitute up to $400 million
of surplus notes for the Treasuries in the trust at
any time during a 10-year period for any “business
reason,” with the surplus notes carrying a coupon
of 9.22 percent.14 Although two other insurers
issued similar notes, this type of structure did not
achieve a significant segregation of Nationwide’s
liabilities, leaving investors exposed to the general
business risk of the insurer and to the risk that
Nationwide might default on the notes.
The structure that has achieved a greater
degree of success is the CAT bond. CAT bonds
were modeled on asset-backed-security transac-
tions that have been executed for a wide variety
of financial assets including mortgage loans, auto-
mobile loans, aircraft leases, and student loans.
The first successful CAT bond was an $85 million
issue by Hannover Re in 1994 (Swiss Re, 2001).
The first CAT bond issued by a nonfinancial firm,
occurring in 1999, covered earthquake losses in
the Tokyo region for Oriental Land Company, the
owner of Tokyo Disneyland.
A CAT bond structure is shown in Figure 11.
The transaction begins with the formation of a
single purpose reinsurer (SPR). The SPR issues
bonds to investors and invests the proceeds in
safe securities such as Treasury bonds. Embedded
in the bonds is a call option that is triggered by a
defined catastrophic event. On the occurrence of
the event, proceeds are released from the SPV to
help the insurer pay claims arising from the event.
In most bonds issued to date, the principal is fully
at risk; that is, if the contingent event is suffi-
ciently large, the investors could lose the entire
principal in the SPV. In return for the option, the
insurer pays a premium to the investors. The fixed
returns on the Treasuries are usually swapped
for floating returns based on LIBOR or some
other widely accepted index. Consequently, the
14 Surplus notes are debt securities issued by mutual insurance
companies that regulators treat as equity capital for statutory
accounting purposes. The issuance of such notes requires regulatory
approval.
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13 Contracts were available based on a national index, five regional
indices, and three state indices for California, Florida, and Texas.investors receive LIBOR plus the risk premium
in return for providing capital to the trust. If no
contingent event occurs during the term of the
bonds, the principal is returned to the investors
upon the expiration of the bonds.
Insurers prefer to use an SPR to capture the
tax and accounting benefits associated with tradi-
tional reinsurance.15 Investors prefer SPRs to iso-
late the risk of their investment from the general
business and insolvency risks of the insurer,
thus creating an investment that is a “pure play”
in catastrophic risk. As a result, the issuer of the
securitization can realize lower financing costs
through segregation. The transaction also is more
transparent than a debt issue by the insurer,
because the funds are held in trust and are released
according to carefully defined criteria. The bonds
also are attractive to investors because catastrophic
events have low correlations with returns from
securities markets and hence are valuable for
diversification purposes (Litzenberger, Beaglehole,
and Reynolds, 1996). Although the $100-billion-
plus “Big One” hurricane or earthquake could
drive down securities prices, creating systematic
risk for CAT securities, this systematic risk is
considerably lower than for most other types of
assets, especially during more normal periods.
In the absence of a traded underlying asset,
insurance-linked securities have been structured
to pay-off on three types of variables: insurance-
industry catastrophe loss indices, insurer-specific
catastrophe losses, and parametric indices based
on the physical characteristics of catastrophic
events. The choice of a triggering variable involves
a trade-off between moral hazard and basis risk.
Securities based on insurer-specific (or hedger-
specific) losses, often called indemnity CAT bonds,
have no basis risk but expose investors to moral
hazard; whereas securities based on industry loss
indices or parametric triggers greatly reduce moral
hazard but expose hedgers to basis risk.
CAT bonds are an innovative financing solu-
tion.16 However, although there have been approx-
imately 120 bonds issued to date, the amount of
risk capital that has been raised remains small
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15 Harrington and Niehaus (2003) argue that an important advantage
of CAT bonds as a financing mechanism is that corporate tax costs
are lower for CAT bonds than for financing through equity; also,
CAT bonds pose less risk in terms of potential future degradations
of insurer financial ratings and capital structure than financing
through subordinated debt.
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16 However, the concept is actually not a new one. It is similar to the
practice of bottomry, which dates at least to classical Greek and
Roman times. In a bottomry contract, the lender extended a loan
to finance a voyage. If the ship returned to port, the loan was repaid
with interest, but if the ship sank, the loan was forgiven.relative to the global reinsurance market. The
number of issues and risk capital raised are shown
in Figure 12, which shows a total of about $10
billion raised by March 2005. In comparison, the
equity capital of the global reinsurance industry
and the U.S. property-casualty insurance industry
are approximately $350 billion and $400 billion,
respectively. However, the potential for the use of
securities markets to finance catastrophic risk is
significant. The amount of asset-backed securities
outstanding is nearly $2 trillion (Bond Market
Association, 2006).
Because of the as-yet unrealized potential of
the CAT bond market, it is of interest to explore
the possible reasons for the limited amount of
risk capital raised to date. One possible explana-
tion is that the bonds appear expensive relative
to conventional reinsurance. Structuring a CAT
bond deal requires significant expenditures on
professional expertise from investment bankers,
accountants, actuaries, and lawyers. In addition,
the spreads on the bonds have tended to be high—
often several times the expected losses on the
bonds.17
Possible explanations for the high-risk premia
on the bonds include investor unfamiliarity with
the contracts (a “novelty” premium), the low liq-
uidity of the contracts issued to date (a liquidity
premium), and investor uncertainty about the
accuracy of the models used to estimate expected
losses of the reinsurance (a “model risk” pre-
mium).18 In addition, although the catastrophic
events observed in the United States before the
mid-1990s have been uncorrelated with returns
in securities markets, this may not be true of a
mega-earthquake in California or even a hurricane
of the magnitude of Katrina. Thus, the spreads
may also reflect a “stealth beta” premium.
17 Cummins, Lalonde, and Phillips (2004) tabulate spreads on CAT
bonds issued from 1997 through March of 2000 and find that the
median ratio of bond spread to expected loss is 6.77.
18 The expected losses under CAT bonds are estimated by catastrophe
modeling firms such as Applied Insurance Research and Risk
Management Solutions. These firms have developed elaborate and
highly sophisticated simulation models that simulate catastrophic
events using meteorological and seismological models along with
actuarial and other modeling approaches. They have constructed
extensive data bases on the value of property exposed to loss in
the United States and other major countries. 
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CAT Bonds: New-Issue Volume and Number of Deals, 1998-2005
SOURCE: Lane Financial (2005).Although CAT bonds seem to sell at high
premiums over expected losses, in fact, prices of
conventional excess-of-loss reinsurance also tend
to have high spreads. Froot (2001) documents
spreads up to seven times expected losses during
the period 1989-98 in the catastrophe reinsur-
ance market. Thus, it is more likely that the high
spreads are due to the fact that catastrophe risk
is expensive to hedge rather than due to a pecu-
liarity of CAT bonds per se. Moreover, the costs
of financing catastrophe risk through CAT bonds
have been declining. Investment banks have suc-
ceeded in reducing transactions costs as they have
gained experience with insurance-linked securi-
tizations, and the spreads on the bonds have fallen
over time. This is shown in Figure 13, which plots
the average spread on CAT bonds and the average
expected loss on the left axis and the ratio of the
spread to the expected loss on the right axis, from
the third quarter of 2001 through the fourth quar-
ter of 2004. Spreads were averaging 600 basis
points at the beginning of the period shown but
had declined to about 450 basis points by the end
of 2004. In addition, the ratio of the spread to the
expected loss declined from around 7 in 2001:Q3
to about 3.5 in 2004:Q4.
Another rationale sometimes given for the
limited size of the CAT bond market is lack of
investor interest. Although that may have been
true at one time, recent data suggest that there
is broad market interest in CAT bonds among
institutional investors. Figure 14 shows the per-
centage of new issue volume by investor type in
1999 and 2004. In 1999, insurers and reinsurers
were among the leading investors in the bonds,
accounting for more than 50 percent of the market;
that is, insurers were very prominent on both the
supply and demand sides of the market. However,
in 2004, insurers and reinsurers accounted for
only 7 percent of demand. Money managers and
hedge funds bought 56 percent of the 2004 bond
issues, and dedicated CAT bond mutual funds
accounted for 33 percent. The declining spreads
and increasingly broad market interest in the
bonds provide some indication that the bonds
may begin to play a more important role relative
to conventional reinsurance.
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CAT Bonds Absolute and Relative Yields
SOURCE: Lane Financial (2005).There are also regulatory and accounting
issues that may be impeding the more wide-
spread usage of CAT bonds. U.S. insurance regu-
lators have two concerns about CAT bonds: (i)
non-indemnity CAT bonds may expose insurers
to excessive basis risk and (ii) insurers may use
securitized risk instruments as speculative invest-
ments. As a result, some regulators may deny rein-
surance accounting treatment for non-indemnity
CAT bonds. Fortunately, however, it is relatively
straightforward to satisfy both concerns and avoid
regulatory problems. Contracts can be structured
to pay-off on narrowly defined geographical
indices or combinations of indices that are highly
correlated with the insurer’s losses. Concerns about
speculative investing can be addressed through
dual-trigger contracts, where two triggers have to
be satisfied for the insurer to collect, one based
on an industry loss index and the second based
on the insurer’s own losses from the event. The
insurer’s payoff is based on its ultimate net loss,
a familiar reinsurance concept equal to the
insurer’s total loss from an event less collections
under reinsurance contracts.19
A second potential issue mentioned in some
discussions is uncertainty about whether SPRs
need to be consolidated on insurers’ GAAP (gen-
erally accepted accounting principles) financial
statements under new rules regarding “variable
interest entities” (VIEs) that were adopted post-
Enron. However, based on conversations with
industry experts, it appears that properly struc-
tured CAT bonds do not encounter problems from
VIE rules. With the usual CAT bond structure
shown in Figure 11, the SPR is a VIE, but the vari-
ability (uncertainty about the payoff from the
structure to investors) is entirely passed through
to the bond holders. The insurer has no variable
(equity ownership) interest but merely pays peri-
odic premiums to the SPR and receives a contin-
gent payout if the defined event occurs. Finally,
although CAT bonds have not been granted the
tax-free conduit status that is available in the
mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities
markets, off-shore CAT bonds do not create tax-
19 This dual-trigger approach was developed in the market for
industry loss warranties, which is a segment of the reinsurance
market offering this type of contract (McDonnell, 2002).
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CAT Bonds: Percentage of New-Issue Volume Purchased by Investor Type
SOURCE: Swiss Re, Economic Research and Consulting.able events for the issuing insurer. The insurer
deducts the premium payments to the SPR, and
the bond investors pay taxes on the income
received from the SPR in the appropriate jurisdic-
tion. Hence, although it would facilitate develop-
ment of the market to have the regulatory and
accounting rules simplified and clarified, these
rules currently do not constitute insurmountable
obstacles to risk-linked securitizations.
Besides the Chicago Board of Trade options
and CAT bonds, other capital market solutions to
the problem of financing catastrophic loss have
been introduced, including catastrophe equity
puts (Cat-E-Puts). Unlike CAT bonds, Cat-E-Puts
are not asset-backed securities but options. In
return for a premium paid to the writer of the
option, the insurer obtains the option to issue
preferred stock at a pre-agreed price on the occur-
rence of a contingent event. This enables the
insurer to raise equity capital at a favorable price
after a catastrophe, when its stock price is likely
to be depressed. Cat-E-Puts tend to have lower
transactions costs than CAT bonds because there
is no need to set up an SPR. However, because
they are not asset-backed, these securities expose
the insurer to counterparty performance risk. In
addition, issuing the preferred stock can dilute
the value of the firm’s existing shares.20
Government Involvement in
Catastrophe Insurance Markets
The difficulties faced by insurance markets
in financing catastrophic risk have given rise to
pressures for government to become involved in
the market. Government involvement usually
occurs when there has been a major failure in
private insurance markets. In the United States,
the federal government provides subsidized flood
insurance; and the current markets for hurricane
coverage in Florida and earthquake insurance in
California exist largely due to state government
intervention.21 By adopting TRIA, the U.S. govern-
ment intervened to create a market for terrorism
insurance. Governments of several other indus-
trialized countries have also intervened in the
markets for catastrophe insurance. This section
provides a review of the principal government
programs for catastrophe insurance. Because
these programs are subject to book-length treat-
ment elsewhere (e.g., Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2005a,b),
the discussion of program characteristics is brief.
The discussion also emphasizes the programs
adopted in the United States.
Federal Flood Insurance. In the United
States, the federal government provides flood
insurance through the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP), administered by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The
flood program was enacted in 1968 in response
to a market failure in the private flood insurance
market, where floods were generally viewed as
uninsurable because of the concentration of risk
in specific areas and the resulting potential for
catastrophes (Moss, 1999). Flood insurance was
viewed from a policy perspective as a way to pre-
fund disaster relief and provide incentives for
risk mitigation. This type of insurance is impor-
tant because homeowners insurance and other
types of property insurance policies exclude
coverage for floods.
NFIP flood insurance policies are offered at
prices that are subsidized for many buyers and
are sold through private insurers, although the
federal government bears the risk. The program
was designed to be self-supporting and has the
ability to borrow from the government to pay
claims. The stated objectives of the program are
(i) to provide flood insurance coverage to a high
proportion of property owners who would benefit
from such coverage, (ii) to reduce taxpayer-funded
disaster assistance resulting from floods, and (iii)
to reduce flood damage through flood-plain man-
agement and enforcement of building standards
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20 For further discussion of capital market approaches to financing
catastrophic risk, see Anderson (2005), Pollner (2001), and Swiss Re
(2001). Other innovative solutions, involving hybrids of traditional
reinsurance and newer approaches, are discussed in Cummins
(2005).
21 Other states, such as Alabama and Louisiana, have also established 
residual market property insurance facilities analogous to the one
in Florida; and many other states have Fair Access to Insurance
Requirements (FAIR) residual market plans to provide insurance
to buyers who cannot find coverage in the voluntary insurance
market. I focus here on the California and Florida plans because
of their prominence and exposure to large catastrophes.(Jenkins, 2006). By August 2005, Jenkins (2006)
estimated that the NFIP had approximately 4.6
million policyholders in 20,000 communities.
From 1968 through August of 2005, the NFIP had
paid $14.6 billion in insurance claims, primarily
funded by policyholder premium payments.
Although the program might seem to be a
success (in terms of the amount of coverage pro-
vided and claims that have been paid), in fact, the
NFIP is badly in need of reform. The program is
not actuarially sound, with some policyholders
paying premiums representing only 35 to 40 per-
cent of expected costs (Jenkins, 2006). Following
the record losses from hurricanes in 2004 and
2005, the program is currently bankrupt and could
not continue to exist in its present state if it were
a private insurer. Moreover, the program pays
significant amounts of money to repair or replace
“repetitive-loss properties;” that is, properties
that receive loss payments of $1,000 or more at
least twice over a 10-year period. It is estimated
that such properties, which represent only 1 per-
cent of covered properties, account for 25 to 30
percent of all loss payments (Jenkins, 2006). Insur-
ance penetration rates are low, even in the most
flood-prone areas, with as little as 50 percent of
exposed properties covered by insurance. In
Orleans Parish, which includes New Orleans, only
about 40 percent of properties were covered by
flood insurance at the time Katrina struck (Bayot,
2005) and coverage rates were even lower in parts
of Mississippi. The NFIP also has been criticized
for not providing effective oversight of the approxi-
mately 100 insurance companies and thousands
of insurance agents and claims adjusters who
participate in the flood program (Jenkins, 2006).
Reforming the NFIP should become a top
priority for federal disaster planning. Having high
rates of flood insurance coverage can significantly
reduce taxpayer-funded disaster-relief payments
following catastrophes, and charging actuarially
sound premiums would provide proper incentives
for flood-plain management.22 There are two
approaches that could be taken to reforming the
program: (i) Continue providing federal flood
insurance but fix the problems with the current
program. This would entail charging premiums
sufficient to cover both claims and program
expenses and providing a safety cushion to build
up reserves during low-loss years to reduce the
need for federal borrowing during years when
catastrophes occur. Further, other problems identi-
fied by the GAO would also need to be rectified.
(ii) Adopt a solution with a higher degree of pri-
vate sector involvement. This could be done fol-
lowing the pattern of the federal terrorism program
by requiring private insurers to “make available”
private flood insurance policies at actuarially
determined prices in flood-prone areas. Although
it is probable that private insurers could provide
such coverage without federal support, by issuing
disaster bonds (similar to CAT bonds) and through
conventional reinsurance solutions, consideration
should be given to providing federal reinsurance
at prices that would be self-supporting in the long
run. The private sector solution is attractive for a
number of reasons, including the relative effi-
ciency of insurers in settling insurance claims in
comparison with the often chaotic federal response
to disaster relief. Under either solution to NFIP
reform, rules should be tightened to eliminate
repetitive-loss properties from the program, and
lenders should be required to enforce mandatory
participation in the program as a condition for
granting and retaining mortgage loans, as is
presently done for homeowners insurance.
Windstorm Coverage in California and
Florida. Windstorm coverage is presently pro-
vided by private insurers through homeowners
and other property insurance policies. The
California and Florida programs are noteworthy
in that they do not involve the direct government
provision of insurance but the creation of quasi-
governmental entities not supported by taxpayers.
Following the 1994 Northridge earthquake,
the market for earthquake insurance in California
collapsed as private insurers stopped writing
coverage. The California legislature responded
in 1996 by creating a quasi-public entity, the
California Earthquake Authority (CEA), to provide
earthquake insurance to Californians. The CEA
is not a government agency but operates under
22 For further discussion of the role of insurance in risk mitigation,
see Kunreuther (1996).
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cally, the policies written by the CEA are earth-
quake “mini-policies” designed by the legislature
that provide less-extensive coverage than provided
by private insurers pre-Northridge. The legislature
also mandated that coverage be provided at sound
actuarial prices, although these have been “tem-
pered” somewhat to subsidize policyholders in
high-risk areas. The legislature also required that
the CEA be funded by capital contributions of
about $700 million from private insurers licensed
in California in lieu of requiring them to write
earthquake insurance. The CEA had claims-paying
ability of about $6.9 billion at the end of 2004
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005). Putting this in
perspective, recall that the Northridge earthquake
caused insured losses of $18.5 billion (Table 1).
However, because of the mini-policies and because
fewer residences have earthquake insurance now
than before 1994, it is probable that the CEA could
withstand damages on the scale of Northridge.
Since the creation of the CEA, private insurers
have re-entered the California earthquake market.
In 2004, approximately 150 companies wrote non-
zero earthquake insurance premiums in California
(California Department of Insurance, 2005). Of the
$985 million in California earthquake premiums
written in 2004, however, the CEA accounted for
47.3 percent; and private insurers generally write
insurance in relatively low-risk areas of the state
(Jaffee, 2005). Nevertheless, the design of the CEA,
and especially its mandate to charge actuarially
justified premium rates, has had the effect of not
crowding-out the private sector. Something of a
puzzle in the California market, however, is that
only a small proportion of eligible property owners
actually purchase the insurance. In the home-
owners market, 33 percent of eligible properties
purchased earthquake insurance in 1996, the
CEA’s first year, but only 13.6 percent had insur-
ance in 2003. The rationale usually given for the
low market penetration is that most buyers con-
sider the price of insurance too high for the cov-
erage provided, even though premiums are close
to the expected losses (Jaffee, 2005).
As in California following Northridge, the
hurricane market in Florida was significantly
destabilized by Hurricane Andrew in 1992.23 In
response to insurer attempts to withdraw and
reprice windstorm coverage following the event,
the state placed restrictions on the ability of
insurers to decline renewal of policies and to
increase rates. To provide an escape valve for
policyholders who were unable to obtain coverage,
the state created the Florida Residential Property
and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association
(FRPCJUA), a residual market facility. Insurers
doing business in the state were required to be
members of the facility, which insured people
and businesses who could not obtain property
coverage from the voluntary insurance market.
The FRPCJUA was empowered to assess insurers
if premiums were not sufficient to pay claims,
and there was no explicit government backing.
A similar residual market facility was formed to
provide “wind only” coverage along the coast—
the Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association.
In 2002, the two residual market plans were
merged to form the Citizens Property Insurance
Corporation, a tax-exempt entity that provides
coverage to Floridian consumers and businesses
who cannot find coverage in the voluntary market.
Citizens operates like an insurance company in
charging premiums, issuing policies, and paying
claims. If premiums are insufficient, it has the
authority to assess insurers doing business in the
state to cover the shortfall. It also has the ability
to issue tax-exempt bonds if necessary. Citizens
was severely stressed by the four hurricanes that
hit Florida in 2004, as it struggled to handle the
massive numbers of claims that were filed. In
2004, Citizens wrote $1.4 billion in premiums,
accounting for 34 percent of the Florida property
insurance market. Unlike California earthquake
insurance, the market penetration of property
insurance coverage in Florida is very high, in part
because mortgage lenders require mortgagors to
purchase insurance.
To provide additional claims-paying capacity,
Florida also created the Florida Hurricane
Catastrophe Fund (FHCF), a state-run catastrophe
reinsurance fund designed to assist insurers writ-
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23 For further economic analysis of the Florida windstorm insurance
market, see Grace, Klein, and Liu (2006).ing property insurance in Florida. Insurers writing
residential and commercial property insurance
in the state are required to purchase reinsurance
from the FHCF based on their exposure to hurri-
cane losses in the state. The FHCF does not have
state financial backing. However, it is operated as
a state agency and is exempt from federal income
taxes, enabling it to accumulate funds more rap-
idly than private insurers. In addition, the fund
has the authority to assess member insurers within
limits in case premiums and reserve funds are
insufficient and also has the ability to issue tax-
exempt bonds. The catastrophe reinsurance issued
by the fund kicks in after an industry retention
of $4.5 billion, and the fund has claims-paying
ability of about $15 billion. The FHCF helped to
stabilize the property insurance market following
the 2004 hurricane season and Hurricane Wilma
in 2005.
The California and Florida experience shows
that government can play an important role in
making insurance available without directly com-
mitting taxpayer funding. These programs also
have the virtue of not crowding-out private insur-
ers, although it is possible that the mandatory
purchase feature of the FHCF may have crowded-
out some private reinsurance. However, because
these are government-mandated and -designed
programs, they probably are not as efficient as
purely private market solutions.
Terrorism Insurance. Prior to the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, terrorism
was generally covered by most property-casualty
insurance policies. In fact, the risk was consid-
ered so minimal by insurers that terrorism was
usually included at no explicit price. Likewise,
reinsurers generally covered primary companies
for terrorism as part of their reinsurance coverage;
and reinsurers paid most of the claims resulting
from the WTC attack. After 9/11, however, rein-
surers began writing terrorism exclusions into
their policies, leaving primary insurers with vir-
tually no opportunity to reinsure their exposure.
As a result, the primary insurers sought to write
terrorism exclusions into their own policies.
Recognizing that substantial exposure to terrorism
risk without adequate reinsurance could pose
insolvency risks, state insurance regulators rap-
idly approved terrorism exclusions. By early
2002, insurance regulators in 45 states allowed
insurers to exclude terrorism coverage from most
of their commercial insurance policies.24
In February 2002, the Government Accounting
Office (GAO) gave congressional testimony pro-
viding “examples of large projects canceling or
experiencing delays...with the lack of terrorism
coverage being cited as the principal contributing
factor” (Hillman, 2002, p. 9). According to a survey
by the Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers,
in the first quarter of 2002, the market for property-
casualty insurance experienced “sharply higher
premiums, higher deductibles, lower limits and
restricted capacity from coast to coast and across
the major lines of commercial insurance.”25 In
November 2002, Congress responded to these
problems by passing TRIA. Through TRIA, the
federal government required property-casualty
insurers to offer or “make available” terrorism
insurance to commercial insurance customers
and created a federal reinsurance backstop for
terrorism claims.
TRIA established the Terrorism Insurance
Program within the Department of the Treasury.
The program, which has been extended through
December 31, 2007, covers commercial property-
casualty insurance—all insurers operating in the
United States are required to participate. Insurers
are required to “make available property and
casualty insurance coverage for insured losses
that does not differ materially from the terms,
amounts, and other coverage limitations applicable
to losses arising from events other than terrorism”
(U.S. Congress, 2002, p. 7). The legislation thus
nullified state terrorism exclusions and requires
that insurers offer terrorism coverage. The wording
of the Act implicitly omits coverage of chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) haz-
24 An exception to the general exclusion of terrorism from commercial
insurance policies following 9/11 is coverage for workers-
compensation insurance, which is mandated by state law to cover
work injuries from all causes. The states did not revise the workers-
compensation laws to allow terrorism exclusions. Terrorism exclu-
sion also were not introduced for personal-lines policies such as
automobile and homeowners insurance.
25 Council of Insurance Agents and Brokers (2002).
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property-casualty policies.26
For the federal government to provide pay-
ment under TRIA, the Secretary of the Treasury
must certify that a loss was due to an act of ter-
rorism, defined as a violent act or an act that is
dangerous to human life, property, or infrastruc-
ture, and to have “been committed by an individ-
ual or individuals acting on behalf of any foreign
person or foreign interest, as part of an effort to
coerce the civilian population of the United States
or to influence the policy…of the United States
Government by coercion” (U.S. Congress, 2002,
p. 3). Acts of war are excluded, and losses from
any terrorist act must exceed a specified monetary
threshold before the Act takes effect. The thresh-
old was originally $5 million, increasing to $50
million in 2006 and $100 million in 2007.
If a loss meets these requirements, the loss is
shared by the insurance industry and the federal
government under the deductible, copayment, and
recoupment provisions of the Act. The coverage
structure of the Act is diagramed in Figure 15. In
2005, each individual insurer had a terrorism
insurance deductible of 15 percent of its direct
earned premiums from the prior calendar year,
which increases to 17.5 percent in 2006 and 20
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Figure 15
Coverage Under the TRIA of 2002
NOTE: TRIA as extended by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Extension Act of 2005.
SOURCE: GAO (2004), Marsh (2005b).
Overall Liability Limit = $100 Billion
Federal Share
90% in 2005-06, 85% in 2007,
with Discretionary Recoupment
Program Trigger
$    5 Million in 2005
$  50 Million in 2006
$100 Million in 2007
Insurer Maximum Loss
$32.5 Billion in 2006





































Deductible and Mandatory Recoupment
Deductible (% of Premiums): 15% in 2005, 17.5% in 2006, 20% in 2007
Aggregate Retention Limit: $15B in 2005, $25B in 2006, $27.5B in 2007
26 The TRIA Extension Act in 2005 excluded some types of commer-
cial insurance that had been covered under the original TRIA.
Specifically, coverage was eliminated for commercial auto, burglary,
surety, professional liability, and farmowners multiple-peril insur-
ance (Marsh, 2005b).percent in 2007. Above the deductible, the federal
government pays for 90 percent of all insured
losses in 2005-06, decreasing to 85 percent in
2007. However, the law provides for mandatory
recoupment of the federal share of losses up to
the level of the “insurance marketplace aggregate
retention,” which is $15 billion in 2005, $25
billion in 2006, and $27.5 billion in 2007. This
recoupment is to occur through premium sur-
charges on property-casualty insurance policies
in force after the event, with a maximum surcharge
of 3 percent of premiums per year. In addition,
the Secretary of the Treasury has the discretion
to demand additional recoupment, taking into
account the cost to taxpayers, the economic con-
ditions of the commercial marketplace, and other
factors. In other words, the Secretary of the
Treasury could choose to recoup 100 percent of
federal outlays under this program through ex
post premium surcharges. The total, combined
liability of the government and private insurers
is capped at $100 billion.
In both 2006 and 2007, insurers are exposed
to potentially large losses under TRIA. As shown
in Figure 15, the deductible and recoupment pro-
visions expose insurers to possible losses as high
as $32.5 billion in 2006 and $37.4 billion in 2007.
Although these losses would be large by historical
standards, they are of the same order of magnitude
as the losses from the World Trade Center and
Katrina, which the industry was able to absorb.
In addition, the analysis of Cummins, Doherty,
and Lo (2002) suggests that the industry could
sustain losses of this magnitude without destabi-
lizing insurance markets.
Government Catastrophe Insurance in Other
Countries. This section provides a brief overview
of the government role in catastrophe insurance
in other countries based on OECD (2005a,b), GAO
(2005), and other sources. Natural disaster pro-
grams are discussed first, followed by terrorism.
In many OECD countries, governments use
tax revenues to establish prefunded disaster-relief
funds. This approach is used in countries such
as Australia, Denmark, Mexico, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Poland (Freeman and Scott, 2005).
In several of these countries, the government pro-
vides compensation only for losses that cannot
be privately insured. This approach is somewhat
similar to the disaster-relief funding provided by
the federal government in the United States.
Several countries have established government
insurance programs to provide coverage for natural
disasters. The government collects premiums in
return for the coverage, and private insurers gen-
erally market the policies and handle claims settle-
ment and other administrative details. An example
is Consorcio de Compensacion de Seguros (CCS),
which was established by the Spanish government
in 1954. CCS is a public corporation that provides
insurance for “extraordinary risks,” including
both natural catastrophes and terrorism. The
extraordinary risks coverage is mandatory and is
provided as an add-on to private market property
insurance policies. A premium is collected for
the coverage, which is passed along to CCS by
the private insurers.
Another approach, somewhat similar to TRIA,
is for the government to act as a reinsurer rather
than a primary insurer as it does in Spain. An
example is France, which has two programs,
the National Disaster Compensation Scheme
and Fonds National de Garantie des Calamites
Agricoles. The former is backed by a state-
guaranteed public reinsurance program, Caisse
Centrale de Reassurance (CCR), which provides
unlimited government backing for catastrophe
losses. Catastrophe insurance is mandatory for
all private non-life insurance policies. Insurers
can then reinsure the risk with CCR, which essen-
tially serves as reinsurer of last resort. Premium
surcharges for the catastrophe insurance are set
by the French government.
Another example of the government as rein-
surer is provided by the Japan Earthquake
Reinsurance Company, which reinsures natural
hazards such as earthquakes and tsunamis in
Japan. All earthquake insurance written by private
insurers in Japan is reinsured with the Japan
Earthquake Reinsurance Company. Reinsurance
coverage is based on a layering approach, such
that 100 percent of the loss in the lowest-loss layer,
up to 75 billion yen, is borne by private insurers;
the loss is split evenly between private insurers
and the government when the loss is between 75
billion and 1.0774 trillion yen; and 95 percent of
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is between 1.0774 and 4.5 billion yen (Freeman
and Scott, 2005).
According to the OECD (2005b), there are
government terrorism insurance programs in
eight OECD countries: Australia, Austria, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. All of the pro-
grams were established after the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks except for the Spanish pro-
gram, where coverage is provided by CCS, and
the U.K. program, which was established in 1993
in response to Irish Republican Army terrorist
attacks. The programs vary along several important
dimensions, including coverage layers and
amounts, the limitations on the liability of private
insurers, whether a premium is charged for the
government reinsurance, and whether the plan is
temporary or permanent. In the following, I give
examples based on the most prominent plans
rather than providing a comprehensive analysis.
In December 2001, a new reinsurer called
Gestion de l’Assurance et de la Reassurance des
Risques Attentats et Actes de Terrorisme
(GAREAT) was established in France to reinsure
terrorism risk insurance written by private insur-
ers. The French government acts as reinsurer of
last resort, providing unlimited reinsurance cov-
erage through CCR. As is common in conventional
catastrophe reinsurance, government terrorism
reinsurance coverage is provided in a sequence
of layers. The first layer of 400 million euros of
coverage is provided by the private insurers who
participate in GAREAT. As of 2005, there are two
layers of private market reinsurance: The first layer
provides limits of 1.2 billion euros in excess of
the 400 million euro primary layer, and the second
layer provides 400 million euros in excess of 1.6
billion euros. Above 2 billion euros, unlimited
coverage backed by a government guarantee is
provided by CCR. As with other catastrophe insur-
ance in France, terrorism coverage is mandatory
for all property insurance. A premium is collected
for the government reinsurance, which is remitted
to the government. GAREAT is set to expire at the
end of 2006 (Michel-Kerjan and Pedell, 2005).
In Spain, terrorism insurance is provided
under the CCS program. Therefore, it is mandatory
for all non-life insurance. There is no layering.
All extraordinary risks coverage is ceded to CCS,
which is backed by an unlimited government guar-
antee. Policyholders pay a premium surcharge
for the coverage provided by CCS, including ter-
rorism coverage. The program is permanent.
In Germany, a specialist insurer, EXTREMUS,
was established in 2002 to provide terrorism
insurance. The program is set to terminate at the
end of 2007. Coverage is not mandatory in
Germany, and demand for terrorism insurance is
reportedly very low. The first 2 billion euros of
coverage is provided by private insurers and rein-
surers, and there is excess reinsurance coverage
(8 billion euros in excess of 2 billion euros) pro-
vided by the German government in return for a
premium. The annual maximum indemnity for
each client is limited to 1.5 billion euros.
In the United Kingdom, a mutual reinsurance
company, Pool Re, was established in 1993 to
provide terrorism reinsurance to insurers writing
insurance in the United Kingdom. Pool Re has a
retrocession arrangement with the British Treasury
to provide the ultimate layer of reinsurance. The
first layer of coverage is provided by primary
insurers, up to 75 million pounds per event or
150 million pounds per year (in 2005), industry-
wide. Coverage is then provided by Pool Re up
to the full amount of its resources. Coverage for
events that exhaust the funds in Pool Re is pro-
vided by the government in return for a premium.
Among the eight OECD terrorism programs
covered in OECD (2005b), only Austria’s does
not involve some form of government insurance.
Among the seven programs with government back-
ing, five are temporary and four have fixed expira-
tion dates. Government reinsurance is unlimited
in France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Among
the countries with limits on the liability of the
government reinsurance, the highest limit is in
the U.S. TRIA program. Among the programs with
government backing, only the U.S. program
does not charge a premium for the reinsurance,
although the Secretary of the Treasury has the
authority to seek recoupment of losses exceeding
the industry participation limits. The lack of a
premium is a defect in the U.S. program because
it has the effect of crowding-out private reinsurers,
who cannot compete with free coverage.
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for TRIA, the president of the United States,
Congress, and business leaders argued that the
lack of terrorism insurance was having an adverse
effect on important segments of the economy,
citing cancelled or postponed construction proj-
ects, downgrades of commercial and multi-family
mortgage securities, and other deleterious effects.
However, the evidence was mostly anecdotal
and solid evidence of a macroeconomic impact
from the restrictions on terrorism insurance dur-
ing 2002 has been hard to find. One paper that
looked at several macroeconomic time series,
such as bank construction lending and new con-
struction put in place, did not find any notice-
able interruption in trends that had existed before
September 11, 2001 (Brown et al., 2004).27
Nevertheless, the general assumption has been
that restrictions on terrorism insurance are bad
for the economy, providing a rationale for a
federal role. This section briefly considers the
macroeconomic impact of TRIA, analyzes TRIA’s
success in restoring the market for terrorism
insurance, and evaluates the likely impact if
TRIA eventually expires.
Brown et al. (2004) provide evidence on the
expected economic effects of TRIA by investigating
the stock price reaction to the Act’s adoption on
the industries most likely to be affected by terror-
ism insurance. They conduct a standard event
study of 11 TRIA-related news announcements,
culminating in the president signing the bill into
law on November 26, 2002. The stock price impact
on affected industries of the bill’s passage by
Congress on November 20, 2002, is representative
of the general conclusions of the study. The results,
shown in Figure 16, reveal that TRIA’s passage
had an adverse impact on the stock prices of firms
in the insurance, banking, real estate investment
trusts, and transportation industries and a negative
long-window impact on public utilities. Only in
the construction industry is there any evidence
of a positive stock price impact from TRIA, and
27 A paper by Hubbard and Deal (2004) purports to show that the
expiration of TRIA would have a significant adverse impact on
the macroeconomy. However, the paper appears to have been
written as an advocacy document, and the analysis is not very
convincing.
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Stock Price Impact of the Passage of TRIA (11/20/2002)
SOURCE: Brown et al. (2004).this effect is not statistically significant. The
results imply that TRIA’s passage caused the stock
market to reduce its estimates of expected future
cash flows in nearly all affected industries.
It is relatively easy to explain the negative
stock price reaction of property-casualty insurers
to the passage of TRIA. Prior to TRIA, the avail-
ability of terrorism insurance was sharply cur-
tailed, revealing that many insurers did not believe
they could write terrorism insurance at a profit.
TRIA nullified most coverage restrictions and
required insurers to offer coverage that they did
not want to provide and, moreover, exposed insur-
ers to significant potential losses from TRIA’s
deductible, copayment, and recoupment provi-
sions. Although TRIA left the pricing of terrorism
insurance to the private market, states regulate
insurance prices; and attempts by insurers to
avoid providing coverage by offering insurance
at excessive prices would attract adverse regula-
tory attention. Thus, as shown further below, a
considerable amount of terrorism insurance has
been offered under TRIA that probably would
not have been available without TRIA’s “make
available” rule.
Because the purchase of terrorism insurance
is not mandatory under TRIA, it is more difficult
to explain the adverse stock price reaction in
industries that are buyers rather than sellers of
insurance. At first glance, the Act provided firms
in these industries with a no-obligation option to
buy terrorism insurance that may not have been
available otherwise. However, a more careful look
reveals some possible reasons for the negative
stock price reaction. Brown et al. (2004) provide
two possible explanations. A first explanation is
a type of “Samaritan’s dilemma” problem. That is,
the Act may have reduced market expectations
with respect to future federal assistance for firms
and industries affected by terrorist events by
substituting a federal reinsurance program for a
potentially more open-ended implicit government
commitment. The second explanation is that TRIA
may have created insurance market inefficiencies
by impeding the development of more-efficient
private market mechanisms for financing terrorism
losses, especially because no premium is charged
for the federal reinsurance. A third possible
explanation, which conflicts somewhat with
the Samaritan’s dilemma argument, is that TRIA
implicitly excludes coverage for CBRN hazards,
which have the potential to cause the most severe
losses.
Although initial reports indicated that take-up
rates (the percentage of buyers who accept insur-
ers’ offers of terrorism insurance) under TRIA
were very low, more recent data reveal that signifi-
cant amounts of terrorism insurance have been
purchased under TRIA. Marsh (2004, 2005a) sur-
veyed their clients in 2004 and 2005 to provide
information on terrorism coverage. The results
are shown in Figure 17, which provides quarterly
take-up rates based on approximately 2,400 Marsh
clients from 2003:Q2 to 2004:Q4. The take-up rate
increased from 23 percent in 2003:Q2 to 48 percent
in 2004:Q4. Thus, the large firms which constitute
Marsh’s clientele demonstrated a significant
demand for terrorism insurance, especially in
2004.
Further evidence on terrorism insurance
take-up rates is provided by surveys conducted
by the U.S. Department of the Treasury (2005) as
part of its congressional mandate to provide an
evaluation of TRIA’s effectiveness. The Treasury
surveys are a valuable complement to the Marsh
surveys because they also included smaller firms.
The results, shown in Figure 18, indicate that the
take-up rate increased from 27 percent in 2002 to
54 percent in 2004. This provides further evidence
that a strong demand for terrorism insurance has
existed under TRIA. The 2002 results are also
important because they reveal that terrorism insur-
ance did not disappear between September 11,
2001, and the passage of TRIA. In fact, significant
amounts of coverage were being offered and pur-
chased during this period, even though no federal
reinsurance was in effect.
The final source of evidence on take-up rates
is a survey conducted in 2004 by the Mortgage
Bankers Association (2004). The Association sur-
veyed the commercial and multi-family mortgage
market to determine the prevalence of terrorism
insurance protection for properties covered by
these types of mortgages. The results, shown in
Figure 19, reveal that lenders require terrorism
insurance for mortgages, accounting for about 94
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Percent Buying Any Terrorism Insurance
Figure 18
Policyholder Terrorism Insurance Take-Up Rates
SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Treasury (2005).


















Terrorism Insurance Take-Up Rates: Marsh Estimates
SOURCE: Marsh (2005a).Cummins
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Terrorism Insurance in the Commercial/Multi-family Mortgage Market, 2004















Terrorism Insurance Price as a Percentage of Property Insurance Premiums
SOURCE: Marsh (2005a).percent of loan balances. Of the $616 billion in
loan balances where terrorism coverage was
required, insurance was purchased for $548 bil-
lion, or 89 percent. Respondents estimate that only
$132 billion would have been covered by terror-
ism insurance absent TRIA. Although the accuracy
of this counterfactual estimate is not clear, the
results do indicate the respondents’ belief that
TRIA plays a major role in creating a supply of
terrorism insurance.
The pricing of terrorism insurance was also
analyzed in the Marsh and U.S. Treasury surveys.
Results from Marsh (2005a) are presented in
Figure 20. The figure indicates that terrorism
insurance constituted between 4 and 5 percent of
total commercial property insurance premiums
for the Marsh clients included in the survey and
that prices increased in 2004 for larger properties.
However, even at the 2004 levels, prices do not
seem unreasonable in a relative sense. Figure 21
provides information on the absolute values of
terrorism insurance prices from the Marsh survey.
Terrorism insurance premiums represented 0.01
percent of insured value for relatively low-valued
properties, dropping to about 0.004 percent for
the largest properties.
Further pricing results from the Treasury
surveys are summarized in Figure 22. Perhaps
surprisingly, the results reveal that many insurers
were still not charging an explicit price for terror-
ism insurance following the enactment of TRIA.
In 2002, about 80 percent were not charging for
terrorism coverage, but this had dropped to 40
percent by 2004. Including both the zero price and
positively priced insurance, terrorism insurance
accounted for about 1 percent of total property
insurance premiums in 2002, rising to approxi-
mately 2 percent in 2004. Considering only the
positive-premium terrorism insurance, the terror-
ism premium was about 3 percent of total premi-
ums in 2004. Hence, the price of terrorism coverage
does not seem to be exorbitant under TRIA.
I now turn to an evaluation of what the terror-
ism insurance market might look like without
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Terrorism Insurance Pricing: Median Rates by Total Insured Value
SOURCE: Marsh (2005a).Cummins
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Insurers Charging a Positive Premium (left scale)
% of Insurers Charging a Zero Premium (right scale)
























Terrorism Insurance Premiums as a Percentage of Total Premiums
SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Treasury (2005).
Insurers Writing Non-Certified Terrorism Insurance















Extent of Terrorism Coverage
SOURCE: U.S. Department of the Treasury (2005).TRIA. Some evidence helpful in making this eval-
uation is provided in the U.S. Treasury surveys.
In addition to terrorism insurance reinsured under
TRIA, which is limited to foreign terrorism, some
insurers also write non-certified terrorism cover-
age, which insures against events such as domestic
terrorism not covered by TRIA. The percentages
of insurers writing certified (i.e., TRIA-reinsured)
coverage and non-certified coverage for 2002
through 2004 are shown in Figure 23.28 The
results are striking—approximately 90 percent
of insurers wrote certified terrorism coverage in
2002 through 2004, but only 40 percent wrote
non-certified coverage. Given that non-certified
(i.e., domestic) terrorism events are generally
viewed as less risky than foreign terrorism, these
results may suggest that no more than 40 percent
of insurers would continue to offer terrorism
coverage for foreign terrorism if TRIA expires.
The Treasury also queried responding insurers
about their 2005 renewals that extend into 2006,
when TRIA’s renewal was uncertain. Fifty percent
of the respondents indicated that they would not
provide terrorism coverage “that is roughly similar
to TRIA coverage” for the segment of the policy
period extending into 2006 (U.S. Treasury 2005,
p. 75). Of these respondents, 55 percent planned
to exclude terrorism altogether in 2006, 22 percent
had a contingent exclusion for terrorism going
into 2006, and 24 percent included coverage that
was not comparable to TRIA coverage. These
results do not bode well for the availability of
terrorism insurance coverage absent TRIA.
In conclusion, it is clear that TRIA has been
effective in making terrorism insurance widely
available. That about half of policyholders do not
buy terrorism insurance seems to be more a reflec-
tion of the fact that many policyholders do not
have significant terrorism exposure rather than a
belief that terrorism prices are too high. In fact,
terrorism coverage is being made available at
prices representing only a small proportion of
total property insurance premiums. However,
because the government reinsurance is being pro-
vided for free, it is likely that the current prices
mainly reflect insurer expected losses under the
deductible and copayment provisions of TRIA.
Thus, prices can be expected to rise once the ter-
rorism deductibles, copayments, and recoupment
provisions increase beginning in 2006. 
The survey results also suggest that availabil-
ity of terrorism insurance is likely to decline
sharply if TRIA eventually expires. This could
be a temporary decline until private market solu-
tions begin to emerge. However, the experience
with catastrophic risk insurance in California and
Florida suggests that many buyers, especially in
high-risk areas, will not be able to obtain terrorism
insurance without some form of government
involvement in the market. Although such
involvement does not necessarily imply that the
government should serve as reinsurer of last resort,
the experience of other OECD countries suggests
that some form of government reinsurance may be
needed to sustain the market for terrorism cover-
age in the future. However, care should be taken
in designing any federal terrorism program, to
avoid adverse incentives and unintended conse-
quences. For example, an economic analysis
conduced by Michel-Kerjan and Kunreuther
(2006) shows that it would be possible for large
insurers to “game” the system under TRIA, shift-




This section begins with an evaluation of
theories of government involvement in insurance
markets. The discussion then turns to an evalua-
tion of the principal mechanisms for government
involvement and recommendations for improving
the markets for insurance against catastrophes.
Theories of Government Involvement
Three primary theories of public policy are
relevant in evaluating the role of government in
addressing market failures in the insurance indus-
29 For further economic analysis of terrorism insurance, see
Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan (2004), Kunreuther et al. (2003),
Lakdawalla and Zanjani (2002), and Wharton Risk and Decision
Processes Center (2005).
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28 This distinction is not meaningful in 2002 because federal terrorism
reinsurance did not exist for most of the year. try: laissez faire, public interest, and market
enhancement. Laissez faire theory maintains that
any market-based equilibrium, however imperfect,
provides a more efficient allocation of resources
within the economy than an equilibrium involving
government intervention. From this perspective,
government intervention in markets results prima-
rily from rent-seeking behavior of special interest
groups (e.g., Stigler, 1971). Thus, industry calls
for government protection against catastrophic
risk are viewed as opportunistic attempts to secure
an ex ante wealth transfer from taxpayers.
Several types of inefficiencies can arise from
government insurance programs. Provision of
subsidized insurance is likely to crowd out private
attempts to enter the market, permanently locking-
in an inefficient solution to financing catastrophe
losses. Government programs tend to develop
constituencies that engage in intensive lobbying
to maintain government support, strengthening
concerns about rent-seeking by special interests.30
Subsidized insurance also tends to create moral-
hazard problems whereby policyholders under-
invest in loss prevention. Government insurance
also may create resource allocation problems if
subsidized terrorism insurance leads to over-
building of building types and locations that are
relatively vulnerable to terrorism. Actuarial pric-
ing of government insurance can alleviate some of
these problems. However, because the design of
government programs is determined by politics
rather than the operation of markets, even unsub-
sidized insurance programs are not likely to rep-
resent the most efficient solution. 
The public interest theory of regulation 
contests the laissez faire view (e.g., Musgrave
and Musgrave, 1984). This theory suggests that
market failures can lead to suboptimal allocation
of resources and that government intervention
targeted at addressing the market failures can
improve welfare. Although laissez faire policy
suggests that private sector coordination is opti-
mal, public interest theory suggests that, in spe-
cific instances, the government can improve upon
the market equilibrium by substituting for private
sector coordination. Proponents of public interest
theory, therefore, maintain that the information
asymmetries and bankruptcy costs associated with
the market for terrorism insurance may necessitate
the role of the government in “completing” the
market for terrorism insurance.
The third view of public policy intervention,
the market-enhancing view, takes a middle posi-
tion (e.g., Lewis and Murdock, 1999). The market-
enhancing view recognizes that market failures
can create suboptimal allocations of wealth and
that private sector coordination is not always effec-
tive. This view holds that public policy should
facilitate the development of the private market
but should not create new governmental institu-
tions to substitute for private solutions. The market-
enhancing policy recognizes that government
(de)regulation can help facilitate the creation or
enhancement of private institutions for solving
market failures, such as how the federal govern-
ment facilitated mortgage securitization markets.31
Mechanisms for Government
Involvement
This section first considers natural catastro-
phes and then analyzes terrorism. The private
insurance market seems to have difficulty in pro-
viding adequate coverage for the largest natural
catastrophes. Projected catastrophes, such as a
$100 billion California earthquake or Florida
hurricane, are large relative to the resources of
the insurance industry; and holding additional
equity capital in the industry to shield against
such events does not seem to be feasible (Jaffee
and Russell, 1997). GAAP accounting rules do not
allow insurers to establish reserves for events that
have not happened. Similarly, insurers are not
permitted to take tax deductions for events that
have not yet occurred, requiring that capital to
pay for catastrophe claims has to be accumulated
out of after-tax income.32 In addition, large pools
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30 At least one lobbying group, the Council to Insure Against
Terrorism, was formed specifically to lobby for renewal of TRIA
on behalf of business insurance buyers. Several groups representing
insurance agents and insurance companies also have active TRIA
lobbying efforts.
31 Of course, there is always the risk that government-sponsored
enterprises’ special privileges may remain fully in place years
later, even if the market failures no longer exist. 
32 It is noteworthy that both the California Earthquake Authority
and Florida’s residual market and catastrophe insurance plans
have been allowed to establish reserves using pre-tax revenues.of capital tend to attract corporate raiders and
may induce management to engage in negative
net-present-value projects. Raising capital to pay
losses following a large-loss event also is difficult
because informational asymmetries between
capital markets and insurers regarding loss
exposure and reserve adequacy raise the cost of
capital to potentially prohibitive levels. Thus,
private insurance markets tend to be much more
efficient at cross-sectional rather than cross-time
diversification.
There are several possible solutions to the
cross-time diversification problem. Because the
resources of capital markets are more than adequate
to fund large catastrophes, a market-enhancing
approach would be for the government to facilitate
the growth of the insurance-linked securities
market. This is an attractive solution because it
could be implemented without committing tax
dollars to paying for catastrophe losses. There are
several areas where removal of remaining regula-
tory and bureaucratic barriers as well as simpli-
fication and clarification of rules and approval
procedures would facilitate the securitization of
catastrophic risk. The GAAP consolidation rules
should be clarified and codified for CAT-linked
securities, and such securities should be given
conduit status for federal income tax purposes.
State insurance regulations should be clarified
and streamlined to reduce transactions costs and
enhance the speed to market of new securities.
Even if all regulatory impediments were
removed, the CAT bond market still might not
attain sufficient size to fund major catastrophes.
However, it is also possible that “critical mass”
would be reached, where scale economies and the
ability to form worldwide CAT bond portfolios
would reduce transactions costs and spreads to
the point where the market would rival the asset-
backed securities market. The costs of relaxing
the regulatory and accounting rules are low, so
it would seem to be worthwhile to conduct the
experiment. The federal government could play
a major role by creating a task force to coordinate
with Congress, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, and the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners to bring down the
regulatory barriers.
A somewhat more intrusive solution to the
time diversification problem would be to exploit
the federal government’s ability to implement
intergenerational diversification through federal
borrowing. Unlike private insurers, the federal
government can effectively accomplish cross-time
diversification because it can raise money follow-
ing a disaster by borrowing at the risk-free rate
of interest.33 The government’s ability to time-
diversify led to a Clinton administration proposal
for government intervention in the market for
catastrophe property insurance (Lewis and
Murdock, 1999), whereby the federal government
would hold periodic auctions of catastrophe
excess-of-loss (XOL) reinsurance contracts to
insurers and reinsurers in loss layers where private
market reinsurance is not available. The auctions
would be conducted subject to a reservation price
sufficient to support the expected loss and expense
costs under the contracts as well as a risk premium
to encourage private market “crowding out” of
the federal reinsurance. If a catastrophe were to
occur that triggered payment under the contracts,
the federal government would finance the loss
payments by issuing bonds. Although the proposal
was not adopted, it could provide a model for a
different type of federal involvement in the terror-
ism insurance market consistent with the market-
enhancing view of regulation. However, given
that securitization offers a viable private market
solution, it would be advisable to give higher
priority to exploring that option.
Another alternative to government interven-
tion to enhance the private market would be to
permit insurers to accumulate tax-deductible
reserves for catastrophe losses, a proposal that
has been advocated by the insurance industry
for at least a decade. One obvious problem with
the proposal is that it would reduce federal tax
revenues, when other solutions such as securiti-
zation are available that would not have this effect.
Another problem is that there would be no way
to prevent insurers from reducing reinsurance
purchases in such a way as to substitute tax-
advantaged reserves for other forms of hedging,
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33 The assertion that the government has superior ability to time-
diversify may be challenged on the grounds that it places risks on
taxpayers regardless of their willingness to bear them.with little or no net gain in risk-bearing capacity.
Finally, a tax-subsidized reserving program would
have a crowding-out effect on the securitization
market.
As mentioned above, state governments have
intervened to “make markets” in catastrophe
insurance in California, Florida, and other states.
These might be considered market-enhancing
efforts, except to the degree that they involve an
element of coercion. That is, insurers are required
to participate in the California and Florida pro-
grams if they wish to continue to participate in
the states’ other lucrative insurance markets, such
as the market for automobile insurance. It is likely
that less insurance would be available in these
states, at least on a cyclical basis, if the state-
mandated plans had not been adopted. However,
it is also possible that the private market would
provide adequate coverage if insurance prices
were deregulated, allowing the market to clear.
The periodic difficulties in private markets for
natural catastrophe coverage provide additional
impetus for developing the CAT bond market
because insurers might be more willing to write
coverage on a voluntary basis if more reasonably
priced diversification mechanisms were available
for mega-catastrophes.
The market response to the increasing fre-
quency and severity of catastrophe insurance
losses since the 1990s has potentially quite signifi-
cant implications. In spite of the lack of federal
government intervention in the market for natural
catastrophe insurance, the private market for
natural catastrophe insurance did not collapse
completely. Although insurance and reinsurance
prices rose following Andrew and Northridge,
significant amounts of new equity capital flowed
into the industry and reinsurance prices eventu-
ally declined (Guy Carpenter, 2005). For the
most part, insurance continued to be available in
disaster-prone areas, such as Florida, and private
insurers eventually re-entered the market for
California earthquake insurance. There is evidence
of continuing market anomalies, however, such as
the skewness of reinsurance toward the coverage
of relatively small catastrophes and the thinness
of reinsurance coverage for mega-catastrophes
(Froot, 2001). Nevertheless, private markets for
natural catastrophe insurance have continued to
function with reasonable efficiency in the absence
of federal support.
Terrorism, and particularly mega-terrorism
events, pose more-difficult problems for private
insurance markets than natural catastrophes—
mega-terrorism events potentially cause much
more extensive losses than natural hazards; the
frequency and severity of terrorist events are dif-
ficult to estimate, both inherently and because
much of the most useful information is confiden-
tial for national security reasons; and terrorists
can adjust strategies and tactics to defeat efforts
to protect against terrorism and mitigate loss
severity. The same factors that make terrorism
difficult to insure and its similarity to war risk
may rule out terrorism-risk securitization, at
least on a large scale. Among the other obstacles,
the existence of terror-linked securities might
influence target selection by terrorists, and ter-
rorists and their sympathizers could attempt to
profit by trading in terror-linked securities.34
Consequently, even if government provision of
insurance against natural catastrophes is not
needed, there may be a legitimate role for govern-
ment in the market for terrorism insurance. The
experience under TRIA provides somewhat mixed
messages on the need for a government role—the
stock market reacted negatively to the adoption of
TRIA but survey evidence strongly suggests that
TRIA succeeded in making terrorism coverage
widely available.
There are various mechanisms for government
to become involved in the terrorism insurance
market. Because there is great uncertainty sur-
rounding the insurability of terrorism risk, a guid-
ing principle of any government involvement
should be that programs be designed to not crowd
out the private market. This necessitates that the
program be explicitly priced and that the price
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34 However, there is some evidence that securities markets might
provide a source of risk-bearing capacity for terrorist events. In
2003, the Golden Globe Financing transaction resulted in a $260
million securitization covering the risk of the cancellation of the
2006 FIFA World Cup. The transaction explicitly included terror-
ism risk. Swiss Re has executed two securitization transactions
covering catastrophic mortality risk, including mortality spikes
from terrorism. A key to the success of these issues may be that
they are multi-event bonds, not applying strictly to terrorism
(Swiss Re, 2005b).be set above the expected value of loss. One pos-
sibility would be to adapt the Clinton administra-
tion proposal and auction off federally backed
XOL terrorism reinsurance contracts. Another
would be a reinsurance program patterned after
TRIA but with a positive premium charge and
continuing increases in insurance industry
deductibles to encourage the private market to
develop gradually.
Another important problem is how to handle
CBRN hazards. Under TRIA, the federal policy
approach is to “look the other way” and to per-
mit insurers to exclude CBRN hazards to the
extent they were excluded from non-terrorist
commercial coverages. In this respect, CBRN
hazards are being treated similarly to war risks.
If an XOL reinsurance or TRIA-like program is
to be implemented going forward, a case could
be made for including CBRN hazards. Because
government is likely to compensate CBRN victims
after the fact, it might make sense to handle as
much compensation as possible through a formal
insurance program rather than as disaster relief.
As Katrina has shown, the federal response to a
disaster can be chaotic and inefficient, whereas
private insurers are very effective at settling claims
and have incentives to settle them efficiently pro-
vided the government insurance has appropriate
deductibles and copayment provisions to control
moral hazard.
CONCLUSIONS
The frequency and severity of losses from
natural catastrophes such as hurricanes, earth-
quakes, and tsunamis have increased dramatically
in the past 15 years. Even though the resources
of insurers and reinsurers worldwide also have
grown, the rising costs of catastrophic risks have
placed significant stress on insurance markets.
Man-made disasters also have led to monetary
losses and loss of life. However, until the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, terrorism losses
did not fall into the mega-catastrophe category;
and, in fact, insurers routinely covered terrorism
losses for little or no charge. The 9/11 losses
revealed a shift in the terrorism probability of loss
distribution, which led insurers and reinsurers
to exclude terrorism losses from many insurance
policies. Governments in several countries
responded by adopting government terrorism
insurance programs. The U.S. Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) requires insurers to
offer terrorism coverage in commercial property-
casualty insurance policies and provides federal
terrorism reinsurance. This paper investigates the
appropriateness of government insurance pro-
grams for catastrophic risk, focusing on coverage
for natural catastrophes and terrorist events.
A review of the resources of the insurance
and reinsurance industries as well as the current
state of the market for insurance against earth-
quakes and windstorms in the United States
reveals little need for a government role, beyond
the programs currently in effect in Florida and
California. Adequate insurance is now available
in the states with the highest exposure to natural
catastrophes. The earthquake and hurricane insur-
ance markets in the United States fall under the
category of a second-best solution; that is, better
than an alternative system involving a more-
intrusive role for government
Although few policyholders in California
purchase earthquake coverage, windstorm insur-
ance is widely purchased in Florida. The lack of
interest in earthquake coverage among buyers in
California is a matter of concern, and the resources
of the California Earthquake Authority (CEA)
would be inadequate to pay claims from a major
earthquake if coverage were more widespread.
This situation is likely to lead to pressures for
massive governmental disaster relief following a
major earthquake. Hence, measures should be con-
sidered, such as making earthquake insurance
mandatory in quake-prone areas of the state and
strengthening the resources of the CEA, on the
hypothesis that it is more efficient to provide
assistance through prearranged programs where
claims are settled by private industry rather than
by ex post government assistance programs.
Even though government insurance for hur-
ricanes and earthquakes does not seem to be
needed, government could deepen and enhance
the markets for these and other catastrophe cov-
erages by removing regulatory impediments to the
development of the market for insurance-linked
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changing GAAP accounting rules for special-
purpose reinsurers, granting insurance-linked
securities conduit status for federal tax purposes,
and giving non-indemnity securities reinsurance
status under state regulatory accounting rules.
Giving insurers the ability to accumulate catas-
trophe reserves on a pre-federal income tax basis
would reduce federal tax revenues without nec-
essarily adding net capacity to insurance markets.
The federal government is already involved
in the market for flood insurance, providing sub-
sidized insurance through the National Flood
Insurance Program. However, the program is badly
in need of reform. It is currently bankrupt and
generally does not charge actuarially sound pre-
miums or have a provision for building up
reserves in low-loss years to minimize the need
for federal borrowing to pay claims. Flood insur-
ance penetration rates are very low, and the pro-
gram is not effectively meeting its stated objectives
of encouraging loss mitigation and flood-plain
management. Although the program could and
should be fixed, a better alternative would be to
develop private sector solutions by requiring
insurers to make available flood insurance cover-
age, perhaps with a federal reinsurance backstop,
and requiring lenders to enforce flood-coverage
requirements, as is presently done for homeowners
insurance.
Terrorism is a more difficult problem for
private insurance markets than natural hazards,
for several reasons. Terrorism is a deliberate act,
similar to war, which has long been excluded
from private insurance policies. Moreover, because
terrorists can potentially use weapons of mass
destruction, terrorism losses are potentially much
larger than losses from natural hazards. Terrorism
losses are also much more difficult to estimate
than losses from natural catastrophes. Prediction
is made especially difficult because terrorists are
constantly changing strategies, targets, and tactics.
Finally, the likelihood of terrorist attacks is affected
by government policies for homeland security,
foreign affairs, and defense; and much of the infor-
mation that would be useful to insurers in estimat-
ing premiums remains confidential for national
security reasons. Consequently, a case can be made
for some degree of government involvement in
the terrorism insurance market.
Terrorism insurance did not disappear after
9/11, and some coverage will undoubtedly con-
tinue to be available if TRIA eventually expires.
However, a review of survey data provides con-
vincing evidence that terrorism insurance is much
more widespread under TRIA than it would have
been with no government reinsurance in place.
Thus, insurance availability will decline, at least
initially, if government reinsurance is withdrawn,
especially for the most vulnerable targets and
locations. As with natural catastrophes, it is likely
to be more efficient to cover terrorism losses
through a pre-existing insurance program rather
than through ex post government assistance.
Fairly priced terrorism insurance also provides
the proper incentives for resource allocation in
terms of the siting of construction projects and
private mitigation efforts.
If government does continue to participate
in the terrorism insurance market, care should
be taken that the program does not prevent the
re-emergence of the private market. In particular,
terrorism insurance should be priced at the
expected loss plus a sufficient risk margin to make
it attractive for private reinsurers to re-enter the
market and to encourage the development of a
terrorism risk-linked securities market. Any gov-
ernment terrorism reinsurance should have indus-
try deductibles at least as large as under TRIA.
Consideration also should be given to covering
the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
hazards under public and private terrorism insur-
ance. Finally, care should be taken in designing
any government terrorism program, to avoid creat-
ing adverse incentives and prevent gaming of the
system by insurers or other market participants.
Future research is needed to determine the
effects of catastrophe losses and catastrophe insur-
ance on the macroeconomy. Although catastrophe
losses are small relative to U.S. and world GDP,
it is still unclear whether such losses and/or the
availability of insurance coverage have significant
macroeconomic effects. It would be useful to fur-
ther analyze the relationship between catastrophes
and macroeconomic time series, such as construc-
tion, bank loans, and mortgages, as well as the
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returns. Such information would be valuable both
to policymakers and to participants in the catas-
trophe insurance and insurance-linked securities
markets. Finally, the experience with Hurricane
Katrina suggests that the time has come for a
comprehensive re-evaluation of disaster assess-
ment, prevention, mitigation, and financing in
the United States.
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